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1. Introduction 
Electronic voting—‘e-voting’—is the option of using electronic means to vote in 
referendums and elections. Different systems exist, such as direct recording electronic 
(DRE) voting machines that record the vote directly without that vote being transmitted 
over the Internet or another network: for example, the interface of a DRE machine can 
be a touch screen, or the voter can fill out the ballot paper and then scan it into the 
system. Most commonly, e-voting refers to voting over the Internet using a personal 
computer (PC) with an Internet connection. There are also other means, such as personal 
digital assistants (PDAs), telephones or mobile phones, that could be used to cast a vote 
electronically. 
It is useful to distinguish between two concepts of e-voting: ‘polling place e-voting’, and 
‘remote e-voting’. ‘Polling place e-voting’ refers to systems where a voter casts his or her 
vote inside a polling station or similar premises controlled by electoral staff; ‘remote e-
voting’ is used to describe those systems where a voter casts his or her vote at any place 
outside the polling station. Both could be relevant for the purposes of this Handbook. 
There are different ways in which electronic means can be used to facilitate external 
voting. The most challenging would be to allow voters who are abroad to transmit a 
vote using electronic means, for example, casting a vote at a PC and transmitting it to 
the electronic ballot box over the Internet. E-voting could also be carried out in the 
supervised environment of a diplomatic or consular mission. However, in the course 
of the research for this paper, no instances of the latter solution being considered were 
found. Only remote e-voting seems to be an option for external voting. 
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VOTING FROM ABROAD 
Section 2 of this chapter looks into examples where the use of remote e-voting is being 
considered as a channel for external voting. Section 3 analyses the arguments in favour 
and against remote e-voting for external voters, and section 4 gives an overview of the 
most important security challenges and possible approaches to solutions. Apart from 
the use of electronic means to vote in referendums and elections, electronic means can 
also be used to support single steps of the external voting process. Section 5 provides 
some examples of how new information and communications technologies, especially 
the Internet, can assist an elector abroad. Finally, section 6 draws conclusions from the 
research. 
This survey is based on some examples of what is being done in the field of e-voting and 
external voting, collected by the Swiss Federal Chancellery. The research is by no means 
comprehensive and does not take into account each and every country that is practising 
e-voting or thinking of introducing it. Nor does the chapter look into the discussion 
about pros and cons of e-voting in general. The list of references and further reading 
in annex C gives some indications as to where further information about e-voting in 
general and the discussion about pros and cons can be obtained. 
There are very few overviews of e-voting projects worldwide. An overview dating from 
the summer of 2004 is available on the website of the ACE project at <http://aceproject.
org/ace-en/focus/e-voting/>; see also Buchsbaum 2005. 
2. Remote e-voting and external voting 
Some countries are testing and considering the introduction of remote e-voting especially, 
and sometimes even exclusively, for their citizens who are living or staying abroad. 
However, only a few countries allow external voters to cast their votes electronically. 
Furthermore, there are a few experiments with remote e-voting for external electors, 
and sometimes expressions of political intentions to consider the question of remote e-
voting for external electors. This section highlights some examples of countries that are 
considering remote e-voting for their citizens abroad. 
Austria 
In Austria, e-voting is not a top priority for the government. Nevertheless, the Austrian 
Federal Council of Ministers approved an e-government strategy in May 2003, in which 
e-voting is listed as a project in the annex, and in the spring of 2004 the Federal Ministry 
of Interior established a working group on e-voting in order to study and report on 
various aspects of e-voting (Federal Chancellery 2003; and <http://www.bmaa.gv.at/
view.php3?f_id=6016&LNG=de&version>). The working group was not dealing with 
the question of e-voting for external electors. However, the explanatory memorandum 
to the Austrian Federal Act on Provisions Facilitating Electronic Communication with 
Public Bodies (the e-Government Act, available in English at <http://www.ris.bka.
gv.at/erv/erv_2004_1_10.pdf>), which came into force on 1 March 2004, explains 
the provision for setting up a supplementary electronic register as ‘a first step towards 
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enabling Austrian expatriates in future for example to be given the possibility of casting 
votes at Austrian elections in electronic form’ (Explanatory memorandum to the act, 
in German). In early 2007, the Federal Council of Ministers affirmed its willingness to 
look into remote e-voting as an additional means of voting as part of a bigger reform of 
democracy (see <http://www.wienerzeitung.at/DesktopDefault.aspx?TabID=3858&Ali
as=wzo&cob=274850>).
Estonia 
Discussions on remote e-voting started in Estonia in 2001 and one year later, the 
legal provisions for it were put in place. During summer 2003 the National Electoral 
Committee started the e-voting project. The system includes the use of smart cards 
and electronic signatures (see National Election Committee 2005). The first tests of 
the remote e-voting system were held in late 2004 and 2005 during local referendums 
and elections. In March 2007 Estonia held the world’s first national Internet election. 
A total of 30,275 citizens (3.4 per cent) used remote e-voting which was available to 
Estonian voters in Estonia as well as abroad (see National Election Committee, ‘E-
voting Project’). 
France
On 1 June 2003, French citizens residing in the USA were given the possibility of electing 
their representatives to the Council of French Citizens Abroad (Conseil supérieur des 
Français de l’étranger, CSFE; since 2004 the Assemblée des Français de l’étranger, AFE) 
by remote e-voting. The AFE is a public law body that is allowed to elect 12 members of 
the upper house of the French Parliament, the Senate. In 2003, the Forum des droits sur 
l’internet (Internet Rights Forum), a private body supported by the French Government, 
published recommendations on the future of e-voting in France. It recommended that 
remote e-voting should not be introduced, except for French citizens abroad who should 
be able to elect the CSFE by voting over the Internet (see Internet Rights Forum 2003). 
For the elections of 18 June 2006 all French citizens abroad were able to choose between 
three voting channels—personal voting, postal voting or electronic voting (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs March 2006). 
The Netherlands 
In most districts in the Netherlands, voting is done electronically at polling stations. The 
Dutch Government is also considering and testing remote e-voting (<http://www.minbzk.
nl/uk/different_government/remote_e-voting_in>; and Caarls 2004). Dutch nationals 
resident abroad are entitled to vote in elections to the House of Representatives and the 
European Parliament (Hupkes 2005). They have to register with the municipality of 
The Hague for each individual legislative or European election. Dutch electors resident 
abroad are considered to be an ideal test group for an experiment with e-voting and 
telephone voting because they are already permitted to vote by post. The purpose of the 
e-voting project was to ease access for electors abroad and to encourage their participation 
in elections. The evaluation of the use of e-voting during the elections to the European 
Parliament in June 2004 showed that e-voting had an added value and made voting 
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more accessible. Subsequently, in the legislative elections in November 2006, Internet 
voting was made available again as an experiment and an alternative to postal voting for 
Dutch voters abroad. A total of 19,815 valid ballots were cast in this way (see <http://
www.minbzk.nl/bzk2006uk/subjects/constitution_and/internet_elections>).  
Spain 
Since 1995, the Generalitat de Catalunya, the government of the autonomous region 
of Catalonia in north-eastern Spain, has run several pilot projects in parallel with public 
elections using electronic voting machines inside polling stations. In November 2003, a non-
binding remote e-voting pilot was held in parallel with elections to the Catalan Parliament. 
Over 23,000 Catalans resident in Argentina, Belgium, the United States, Mexico and Chile 
were invited to participate using any computer connected to the Internet. The Generalitat 
de Catalunya sponsored this pilot to examine the use of secure electronic voting in the 
future (see <http://www.gencat.net/governacio-ap/eleccions/e-votacio.htm>).
Switzerland
In August 2000 the Swiss Government gave the Federal Chancellery the task of examining 
the feasibility of remote e-voting. An interim report of the Swiss Federal Chancellery 
on remote e-voting called Swiss living or staying abroad ‘the most suitable target group’ 
because remote e-voting could save them time, increase effectiveness and save costs 
(Federal Chancellery August 2004). Since 2002, a variety of legally binding tests of 
remote e-voting have been carried out in the cantons of Geneva (see <http://www.ge.ch/
evoting>), Neuchâtel (see <http://www.guichetunique.ch>) and Zurich (see <http://
www.statistik.zh.ch/produkte/evoting/index.php?p=5>), including between 2004 and 
2006 seven remote e-voting trials on the occasion of national referendums. The pilot 
projects were evaluated in 2005 for a number of different aspects, including the potential 
of remote e-voting to increase voter turnout, the security risks and its cost-effectiveness. 
The evaluation has shown that remote e-voting is feasible in Switzerland (see Federal 
Chancellery, <http://www.bk.admin.ch/themen/pore/evoting/00776>). In March 2007 
the Swiss Parliament adopted the legal basis for harmonizing the voter registers for Swiss 
voters abroad. This is the first step towards the offering the Swiss abroad the possibility 
of remote e-voting, for which there is a strong demand (see <http://www.aso.ch>). 
The USA 
The USA built an Internet-based electronic voting system for the US Department of 
Defense’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP). The SERVE voting system, as 
it was called (Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment), was planned for 
deployment in the 2004 primary and general elections, and would have allowed the 
electors overseas and military personnel to vote entirely electronically via the Internet 
from anywhere in the world. It was expected that up to 100,000 votes would be cast 
electronically. However, SERVE was stopped in the spring of 2004 following a report 
by four members of a review group financed by the Department of Defense. They 
recommended that the development of SERVE be shut down immediately because they 
considered the Internet and the PC not to be sufficiently secure (Jefferson et al. 2004). 
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3. Arguments in favour of and against remote e-voting for external 
electors
3.1. In favour 
The common denominator in the seven countries mentioned above is the fact that they 
wish to make it easier for their citizens abroad to participate in national elections and 
referendums. In that respect, external electors are considered to be one of the most suitable 
target groups for remote e-voting, since there is no comparable voting channel fully available 
for them that would be as comfortable and as accessible. Postal voting—the channel that 
is probably most comparable to remote e-voting—does not offer the same benefits, since 
postal services are sometimes too slow for delivering the ballot paper before voting day 
and thus some external electors are prevented from voting. Other voting channels, such as 
voting at an embassy or diplomatic mission, are not as convenient for the voter, since he or 
she needs to go to a certain place during certain hours. The overall thought behind making 
it easier for external electors to vote in elections and referendums is, of course, to increase 
voter participation and thus strengthen democratic legitimacy. 
Apart from convenience to external electors, there are other reasons in favour of remote 
e-voting. 
1. In some cases, citizens living or staying abroad are considered to be an ideal test group 
for remote e-voting, while the real intention is to introduce this new method for electors 
inside the country as well. 
2. In some cases, citizens abroad are well organized—even better organized than interest 
groups inside a country—and capable of formulating their needs and putting them onto 
the agenda. 
3. Depending on the circumstances and the other voting channels available for external 
electors, remote e-voting might save costs. 
3.2. Against 
Because by and large only those countries that are considering the introduction of remote 
e-voting provide information on the subject, there are only a few arguments to be found 
against the introduction of remote e-voting for external electors. These reasons include: 
1. Security concerns. However, there are no special security concerns with specific regard 
to remote e-voting for external electors. Rather, it is remote e-voting as such that is 
considered to be not secure. The security concerns include doubts about the Internet 
as a means of transmission of confidential information, fear of hacker attacks—both by 
insiders (e.g. software programmers) and by outsiders (e.g. political parties, terrorists or 
other states)—and anxiety about the possibility of undue influence being exerted on the 
voter during the voting process (e.g. ‘family voting’). 
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2. Financial aspects. It may be costly to build the infrastructure for providing remote 
e-voting only to a limited number of electors. The expensive items can be the building 
of a digitized, harmonized register of external electors or the maintenance of security of 
the system. 
3. Equal treatment of all electors (external and internal). In Switzerland for instance, the 
government says that if remote e-voting is introduced it has to be done on a step-by-step 
basis. It should be introduced for ‘internal’ electors first and only after that for external 
electors. The reason behind this is that there is no centralized electoral register for external 
electors (see the case study). External electors from one canton should not be able to 
vote electronically while those from another canton do not have this opportunity. 
The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) answers the question ‘Can I vote via the 
Internet?’ on its website (<http://www.aec.gov.au/_content/What/enrolment/faq_
os.htm>) as follows: 
The introduction of internet or computerised voting is not a feasible proposition at this 
time, as a number of security, technical, financial, access and equity issues have to be 
solved before it could become a fact of electoral life. 
• There is no appropriate software technology for use in full preferential voting system. 
• Many voters, especially the elderly and those with poor literacy and numeracy skills 
may have difficulty with using the internet. 
• There is a risk of fraud and errors occurring in software without the safeguard of paper 
ballots to recount. 
• Start up costs would be significant. 
• The AEC would need to continue to provide traditional voting facilities for those with 
no internet access. 
However, Australian electors in Australia have been able to use polling place e-voting for 
elections to the Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly. In 2001 and 2004, e-
voting was available at four pre-polling voting centres over a two- to three-week period 
and at eight polling places on polling day itself (see <http://www.elections.act.gov.au/
Elecvote.html>).
4. Some security challenges for remote e-voting and possible 
solutions 
Before remote e-voting is introduced, several security challenges have to be faced. 
Table 10.1 gives a first idea of the most important of them. However, each country has 
different legal conditions and different technical infrastructure available. These should 
be taken into account as well. 
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Table 10.1: Security challenges for remote voting and possible solutions
Challenges Possible solutions
Unambiguous identification
The participant in a vote or election must be clearly 
identified and authorized. 
•  Individual code in order to gain access to the system 
• Indication of date of birth and the place of origin for 
the purpose of identity validation and prevention of 
systematic fraud 
• Use of a digital signature 
• Further personal data could be required. 
Authenticity of the e-voting servers
Citizens must have the guarantee that their votes 
are sent to the official servers. 
• The server certificate should be reviewable by the 
citizens (fingerprint control). 
• Authenticity could also be demonstrated by an answer 
code or symbol (image) which can be verified, e.g. on a 
polling card sent to the elector by post.
Unique and universal voting
Citizens are allowed to cast one vote. The casting of 
two or more votes must be prevented. 
• As soon as an advance vote (postal or electronic) 
is cast, the voter could be marked in the electronic 
electoral register. 
• Unambiguous features on the polling card (e.g. any 
tampering with the metallic field or seal covering 
individual ID codes) could indicate that a citizen has 
probably already cast a vote. 
Protection of voting secrecy/protection of privacy
The intention of citizens must remain secret and 
must not be seen by a third party. 
• Separate and divided storing of personal data and vote. 
• Random mixing of votes in the electronic ballot box 
so that it is impossible to gather knowledge of how 
someone has voted by comparing the sequence of 
casting votes and time flags in the electronic electoral 
register 
Hacker attacks to:
(a) voting devices (private computers, etc.): possible 
interception and modification of votes, e.g. by Trojan 
horses (the weakest point of any e-voting system)
(b) vote transaction from client to server: possible 
interception and modification of votes (e.g. man-
in-the-middle attack, domain name server (DNS)-
hacking).
(c) central server platform (heart of the e-voting 
system), e.g. denial-of-service attack.
• Firewall protection
• Code voting 
• Virus scans
• Vote encryption
• Verification by the voter: vote is transmitted as an 
image, not as text information 
• In the transaction dialogue all packages should be 
check-sum tested (hash code) to prove their integrity
• Several redundant servers
• Collaboration with major providers
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Challenges Possible solutions
Force majeure 
Thunderstorms, earthquakes, terrorist attacks etc. 
• Several servers at different locations 
• Housed in highly secure rooms (access control, fire 
protection, emergency power supply) 
Traceability, recounting 
Electronic votes must be recounted if appealed. 
• Voter gets a receipt when his or her vote has been cast
• Audit trail journal of the counting of conventional and 
electronic votes signed by the public servants and 
controllers in charge 
• Separate storage (CD-ROM) of electronic votes and log 
files (encrypted) 
Confidence  
The system and its components must be 
trustworthy. External experts must be able to review 
source codes. 
• Training of controllers
• Use of open-source software (operating system)
• Disclosure of proprietary applications
5. Other support through new information and communication 
technologies 
There are also other, less far-reaching ways in which electronic means—among them the 
Internet—can be used to facilitate voting from abroad. The range goes from providing 
information to facilitating different steps of the voting process without going so far as to 
allow voters to cast their ballot electronically. This section highlights some examples. 
Australia
Electors abroad can do different things by fax: enrol to vote; apply to become an ‘eligible 
overseas elector’; enrol as spouse or child of an eligible overseas elector; enrol as an 
‘itinerant elector’; or apply for a postal vote. 
New Zealand
Overseas electors can download their ballot paper, declaration and supporting 
documentation from the Internet starting three weeks before election day. However, 
they cannot return the ballot papers electronically or vote by email, as the website of 
Elections New Zealand (<http://www.elections.org.nz/voting/how_vote_overseas.
html>) emphasizes. Only overseas electors are allowed to download the ballot paper. 
Completed ballot papers can be returned by fax or ordinary post. Only voters abroad 
are allowed to fax their ballot papers; if a ballot paper is faxed from within New Zealand, 
the vote will not be counted. 
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Singapore
Singapore offers overseas electors the possibility of filling out a registration form online. 
However, the form cannot be transmitted over the Internet, but has to be printed out, 
signed and sent to the Elections Department or any overseas registration centre by 
registered post. Registered overseas electors are assigned to vote at one of the overseas 
polling stations (located within Singapore’s high commissions, embassies or consulates). 
If the elector does not remember which his polling station is, he can find out online 
(<http://www.elections.gov.sg/overseasvoting.htm>).
6. Conclusion 
Electors abroad are clearly a focus group that is of particular interest for those countries 
that are considering the introduction of e-voting in a general manner. At the same time, 
they are a target group that can be difficult to include in e-voting for practical reasons. 
Other countries see a need to introduce e-voting for their external electors but do not 
see the same urgency for introducing e-voting for the internal electors. However, there is 
no definite trend towards the introduction of remote e-voting, not even in the countries 
where the first steps towards it have been taken.
